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in cases involving speedy trial. This would seem proper, for as Judge
Wright points out in his dissent, "Unlike Continental concepts of
Criminal justice, under our law a man charged with crime is presumed innocent. But, under today's decision, an innocent man may
be held in jail for almost six months awaiting his trial. Under this ruling, for the first six months after accusation, the presumption of innocence-and the right to a speedy trial-mean very little to a defendant
35
unable to make bond."
RicHARD V.

MATrINGLY, JR.

EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BANISHMENT COMPARED
Banishment' of an individual from his society has frequently been
made a condition of a suspended sentence or a conditional pardon.
This presents an interesting problem and a seeming conflict. It is generally held that a state may grant pardons conditioned upon a person's leaving the state,2 but cannot make such banishment a condition of a suspended sentence.3 The two recent cases of Mansell v.
Turner1 and Bird v. State5 illustrate these two seemingly divergent
positions.
In the Mansell case, the defendant was a convicted burglar, but
was granted a termination of sentence by the Utah Board of Pardons
conditioned on his leaving the state of Utah. The defendant agreed to
these conditions, but upon his release ignored them, and was returned
to the state's prison. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the conditions amounted to a banishment and was therefore void as against public policy. The petition was denied on the
ground that the Board's power to pardon is plenary and therefore inmIbid.
'Banishment is defined as a form of punishment inflicted for criminal offenses
by compelling the criminal to quit a city, place or country for a period of time
or even for life. Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
"E.g., Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49 (0 o th Cir. 1930); Ex parte Hawkins, 61
Ark. 321, 33 S.W. io6 (1895); Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 2 9 , 28 Pac. 109 (1883); In re
Cammarata, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677 (1954); People v. Potter, I Parker, Grim.
R. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14, 1o S.E. 611 (189o).
OE.g., People v. Lopez, 81 Cal. App. 199, 253 Pac. 169 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927);
People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (1930); Ex parte Sheehan, ioo Mont.
244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935); State v. Hatley, 11o N.C. 522, 14 S.E. 751 (1892); People v.
Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 20o (Suffolk County Ct. 1953); State v. Baker, 58 S.C. III,
36 S.E. 5o (igoo).
'14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P. 2d 394 (1963).
o3i Md. 432, 19o A.2d 804 (1963).
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cludes the power to attach conditions, and that the condition imposed
was not unconstitutional.
In the Bird case, the appellant was convicted of assault with intent to murder, a statutory offense in Maryland. She was sentenced
to a term of not more than ten years, but on her suggestion, the court
suspended the sentence on condition that she return to her native
Puerto Rico and remain there for at least ten years. She challenged
both the judgment and the sentence. The Maryland Court of Appeals
sustained the jury verdict of guilty but upheld the contention that the
sentence of banishment was beyond the power of the trial court and
therefore void. The court further held that an entire new proceeding
was not required, but that the case could be remanded for resentencing alone.
It may at first seem strange that either of these situations would
ever confront the courts. The problem arises, however, when the defendant, who has either failed to leave or returns to the place from
which he was banished, is imprisoned, and then brings a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus contesting the validity of the sentence or conditional pardon. The purpose of this discussion will be to examine
first the cases involving the Mansell situation and secondly those involved in the Bird situation. An attempt will be made to set forth
the rationales expressed by the courts in support of these holdings
and to investigate whether any recent cases are likely to affect either
line of decisions.
The doctrine of the Mansell case, allowing banishment as a condi7
tion to a pardon, 6 is substantiated by the great weight of authority.
If a condition is attached to a pardon, it may be either precedent or
subsequent, provided only that it is not illegal, immoral, or impossible
to perform." The courts generally espouse one of three rationales in
"A pardon may be defined as an executive act of grace by which an individual
is exempted from punishment for a crime he has committed. 67 C.J.S. Pardons §
1 (195o); 5 Wharton's Criminal Law Procedure, § 2196 (12th ed. 1957). The Supreme
Court of the United States has said a pardon is the determination that the public
welfare will be better served by inflicting less punishment than the fixed judgment.
Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
For decisions prior to 1927, see Annot., 6o A.L.R. 1410, 1415-16 (1929). For subsequent decisions, see Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49 (oth Cir. 1930); Pippin v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 450, SE.2d 712 ('941); People ex rel. Ross v. Becker, 382 Ill. 404,
47 N.E.2d 475 (1943); In re Cammarata, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 677 (1954).
8E.g., Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49 (10th Cir. 193o); Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark.
321- 33 S.W. io6 (1895); Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. lo9 (1883); State
ex rel. O'Conner v. Wolfer, 53 Minn. 135, 54 N.W. io65 (1893); People v. Potter,
1 Parker, Crim. R. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); State v. Barnes, 32 S.C. 14, ioS.E. 611
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sustaining such conditions. First, it is said that since the executive's
power is plenary, he may grant something less than a full pardon; or
put more concisely, the greater power also includes the lesser.9 A second rationale is based on the idea that a conditional pardon is like a
contract, gift, or a deed in that it requires delivery by the executive
and acceptance by the grantee. 1 Under this reasoning the grantee is
not being forced to leave the state against his will as he could refuse
the pardon. The third rationale is that since the object of a conditional
pardon is reformation, a prisoner should not be deprived of the
opportunity to avoid further punishment and make a fresh start elsewhere.'1
If the grantee, in violation of the condition subsequent of his pardon, returns to the society 12 from which he agreed to absent himself,
the pardon is terminated and he may be returned to prison, regardless
of his reason for returning.'3 Courts have held that pardons conditioned on banishment are not violative of public policy nor of the
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
but are in fact sanctioned by legislation. 14
In view of the foregoing discussion, it may seem anomalous that
the Bird case, disallowing banishment as a condition to a suspended
sentence, is also supported by the great weight of authority. However,
as distinguished from Mansell, the question in the Bird case is whether
or not the judiciary has the power of the executive to effect banishment
(890). In the case of banishment as a condition to a pardon, the acceptance by the
grantee before the pardon is effective is a condition precedent while the grantee's
remaining away is a condition subsequent to the validity of the pardon.
1
Kavalin v. White, 44 F.2d 49 (ioth Cir. i93o); Ex parte Hawkins, 61 Ark.
321, 33 S.W. io6 (1895); Ex parte Kelly, 155 Cal. 39, 99 Pac. 368 (19o8); People v.
Potter, i Parker, Grim. R. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
"State v. Smith, 17 S.C.L. 283 (Ct. App. 1829); Ex parte Davenport, 11o Tex.
Grim. 326, 7 S.W.2d 589 (1927).
"%Ex parte Paquette, 112 Vt. 441, 27 A.2d 129 (1942).
12The particular society may be any political unit: a county, Pippin v. Johnson,
192 Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712 (1941); a state, Ex parte Davenport, n1o Tex. Crim.
326, 7 S.W.2d 589 (1927); or a nation, In re Cammarata, 341 Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d
677 (1954); People v. Potter, i Parker, Crim. R. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
"Pippin v. Johnson, 192 Ga. 450, 15 S.E.2d 712 (1941). Here, a defendant returned to a county, in violation of a conditional pardon that she remain away,
for the sole purpose of obtaining medical treatment, on credit, which was needed
to save her life. The court held that in spite of her motives, her re-entry terminated the conditional pardon and she was subject to being returned to jail.
"People v. Potter, 1 Parker, Crim. R. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945); State v. Smith, 17
S.C.L. 283 (Ct. App. 1829); State v. Addington, 18 S.C.L. 516 (Ct. App. 1831); see
generally annot., 6o A.L.R. 1410 (1929).
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of one from his society. 15 The answer is clearly that it does not, for
several reasons.
First, it is said that to permit one community to "dump" its convicted criminals on another is against public policy.10 In the leading
case on the subject, People v. Baum,' 7 the court, referring to the
practice of one state sending its criminals to another said:
"It would tend to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and
disturb that fundamental equality of political rights among the
several states which is the basis of the Union itself. Such a

method of punishment... is impliedly prohibited by public
policy."' s
It is in this area that the two situations concerning banishment may
appear hardest to reconcile. Where a pardon is involved the courts
say banishment is not against public policy,' 9 yet this is a primary
reason given for disallowing banishment as a condition to a suspended sentence.
A second reason sometimes given for disallowing the court to pass
a sentence of banishment is that it tends to usurp the power of the
legislature 20 and the prerogative of the executive. 2 ' Punishment is
prescribed by the legislature and applied by the courts. The courts
should not attempt to inflict punishment outside the form and degree
prescribed by legislation. For this reason, several courts have stated
that banishment as a punishment would be valid if permitted by
statute.22 However, it seems the legislatures have seen fit to grant
'5Again, the term society may refer to any particular political unit. Judicial
banishment has been disallowed from a county, Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 628, 173 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946); a state, State v. Baker, 58 S.C. IIi,
36 S.E. 501 (0oo); and a nation, People v. Cortez, 19 Cal. Rptr. 5o (Dist. Ct. App.
1962).

"E.g., People v. Blakeman, 170 Cal. App. 2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959); People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (195o); see annot., 7o A.L.R. 1oo
(i93); State v. Doughtie, 237 N.C. 368, 74 S.E.2d 922 (195); State v. Baker, 58 S.C.
I I1, 36 S.E. 5oi (igoo).
'251

Mich. 187, 231 N.V. 95 (193o) •

18231 N.W. at 96.
'Note 15 Supra. But, in his concurring opinion in Mansell, Justice Crockett
suggests such a condition would be against public policy if the power were merely
exercised by a state to rid itself of its less desirable citizens.
'OEx parte Sheehan, ioo Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935); People v. Wallace,
124 N.Y.S.2d 2oi (Suffolk County Ct. 1953).
Millsaps v. Strauss, 2o8 Ark. 265, 185 S.W.2d 933 (1945); Burnstein v. Jennings, 231 Iowa 1280, 4 N.W.2d 428 (1942); Ex Parte Sheehan, ioo Mont. 244, 49
P.2d 438 (1935).
2Ex parte Scarborough, 76 Cal. App. 2d 648, 173 P.2d 825 (Dist. Ct. App. 1946);
Bird v. State, 231 Md. 432, 19o A.2d 8o4 (1963); Ex parte Sheehan, ioo Mont. 244,
49 P.2d 438 (1935); People v. Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Suffolk County Ct. 1953).
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this power to the executive or one of his agencies rather than the
Courts, and the latter are thereby precluded from exercising this discretionary power under the doctrine of separation of powers, inherent
in the American system of government. "The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons ....are totally
distinct and different.... The former was always a part of the judicial
'23
power; the latter was always a part of the executive power.
24
Considering banishment as a form of punishment, there is a
third possible reason why banishment may be considered a void condition to a suspended sentence. Possibly it amounts to a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. 2

However, several cases have held that banishment, whether it

is a condition to a pardon 26 or a suspended sentence, 27 does not
amount to a cruel and unusual punishment. The courts have had
difficulty in deciding what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
the older cases indicating that this provision was meant to protect
against physical tortures, 28 such as beheading, burning at the stake,
use of the wheel or the rack, disemboweling alive, and other ancient
forms of punishment.
A few recent federal cases indicate that something less than "physical torture or lingering death" may amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. 9 Illustrative of this point is the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Trop v. Dulles,30 where the Court held unconstitutional a provision depriving a native-born American citizen of
his citizenship because of a court martial conviction for desertion.
2People ex rel. Forsythe v. Court of Sessions, 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386, 388
(1894).
-United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (19o5). For a general discussion of this
point, see Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 213, 218-22
(1958).
2""Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
-IPeople v. Potter, i Parker, Crim. R. 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); State v. Smith, 17
S.C.L. 283 (Ct. App. 1829); Ex parte Davenport, lio Tex. Crim. 326, 7 S.W.2d 589
(1927); see Annot., 6o A.L.R. 1410, 1415 (1929).
"People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95 (195o); Ex parte Sheehan, ioo
Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935); People v. Wallace, 124 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Suffolk County
Ct. 1953); Legarda v. Valdez, i Philippine Rep. 146 (1902).
WVilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (191o); State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va. 66, 69 S.E. 385 (191o); Legarda v.

Valdez, i Philippine Rep. 146 (1902).
2Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958);
Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
"0356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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The Court held denationalization subjected an individual to a fate
of statelessness, a fate forbidden by the eighth amendment. Admittedly,
this penalty was not excessive, since desertion was also punishable by
death. Moreover, the death penalty is recognized not to be either cruel
or unusual.3 ' But, the Court said that just because the death penalty
does not violate the constitutional prohibition does not mean anything short of death is permissible. 32 The eighth amendment, though
derived from the Magna Carta and the English Declaration of Rights
of 1688, draws its meaning from an evolving standard of decency designed to protect succeeding generations of Americans.3 3 Banishment
from one's country is a punishment universally decried by civilized
people; the destruction of one's status in society is even more primitive than torture, and the punishment of statelessness is, therefore,
34
prohibited by the eighth amendment.
Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate
that through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 35
at least some of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishments applies to the states. In light of the Trop
decision, it may be that if a state conditions a pardon or suspended
sentence on banishment, it will be struck down as violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Such a decision is certainly within tie realm
of foreseeability, but it is submitted that banishment does not amount
to a cruel and unusual punishment.
Considering first a conditional pardon, it is important to remember that in such a situation, banishment serves an entirely different
purpose than it does for a suspended sentence. It is not penal but
rather is corrective and rehabilitative in nature, and the fact that
there is some restraint of conduct does not necessarily make it penal.36
Also, banishment has a much different effect on the criminal's status
when granted as a condition to a pardon than when imposed as a
condition of a suspended sentence:
"The suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the convic1
1Id. at 99; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (189o) (dictum); See generally,
Note, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 846, 859 (1961).
3'356 U.S. at 99.
-'Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Ex parte Pickens, 1o1 F. Supp. 285 (D.
Alaska 1951); 24B C.J.S. Grim. Laws § 1978 (1962).
-356 U.S. at ioo-o2.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666-67 (1962); Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
3311 B.U.L. Rev. 278 (1931).
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tion and liability following it, and all civil disabilities, remain
and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon
reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots
out of existence the guilt, so that, in the eye of the law, the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the of37
fense."
Therefore, since the banishment is not penal, it certainly could not
be considered cruel and unusual punishment.
The problem of banishment as a part of a sentence is more difficult.
In spite of the Trop decision forbidding involuntary expatriation, 38
it is submitted that banishment from a state, county, or city can be
distinguished. In the case of expatriation, no other country would be
duty-bound to accept the victim as its citizen and he could conceivably be a "man without a country," having no place to settle or reside. A United States citizen, however, has the right of free ingress
and egress from state to state,39 and would not face the same problem of being stateless and unaccepted in any land as would a person
who has been involuntarily expatriated.
Also, there is some logical inconsistency in stating that banishment is a cruel and unusual punishment. A prison sentence is almost
always the convicted criminal's alternative to banishment. Certainly,
a convict would prefer to be free with only a restriction on his ability
to enter a particular state than to be imprisoned and lose all freedom
of movement. From the convict's viewpoint, banishment is hardly
cruel and unusual when he is faced with the alternative punishment
of imprisonment. The development of the eighth amendment now
protects a person against disproportionate penalties 40 and mental
suffering,41 as well as physical torture or lingering death. Banishment
from a state or lesser political subdivision can hardly be dispropornSupra note 23.
3Supra note 31. The Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (963), forbade involuntary expatriation, although not basing its decision on
the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the eighth amendment.
25The Article IV privileges and immunities clause applies to state citizenship,
and as a result each citizen is guaranteed the right of free ingress and egress from
state to state. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, i8o (x868). The fourteenth
amendment privileges and immunities clause applies to rights of federal citizenship
and again, it guarantees the right of free ingress and egress from state to state.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
IOWeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (191o). This can also be inferred from
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 99, where the Court states that any punishment short
of death is not permissible just because the death penalty is not cruel and unusual
in some instances.
"Supra note 30.

